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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE 
STA TE OF UTAH 
SMITH & EDvJARDS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
THE GOLDEil SPIKE LITTLE LEAGUE, 
DEE BLOXHAM, DAVE ANDERSON, 
PETE 1•I01HALVO, GLORIA BOREN, 
TOM LARSE~, PETE FOREMASTER, 
MIKE LESHKO, ROBERT DOWNARD, 
RON WILLIS, LON ESKELSON, 
Rn1WY DEEi'l and STAN SEMS, 









BRIEF OF APPELANT 
Case No. 
14803 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a collection action brought by appellant against 
respondents for a large unpaid debt incurred by respondents 
who purchased baseball uniforms, balls, bats and other base-
ball equipment from appellant in connection with the operation 
of a summer baseball recreation program. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court Judge, The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, 
found respondent, Golden Spike Little League liable for the 
debt incurred, but found no cause of action against all other 
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respond~nts and dismissed appellants claim against them, based 
upon its finding that such other defendants were acting as agents 
within the scope of their authority of Little League Baseball , 
Inc. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the dismissal and further 
asks this court to instruct the lower court to find in favor 
of appellant and against all respondents in conformity with those 
findings by said lower court which are consistent with the facts 
testified to below. 
STATEMErn OF FACTS 
Early in the Spring of 1974, the Golden Spike Little League, 
hereinafter referred to as "Little", was organized for the pur-
pose of providing organized baseball activities for youngsters 
living in several small communities located just north of Ogden, 
Utah. Exhibit 10-P. The association was subsequently chartered 
by the Little League Baseball, Inc., hereinafter referred to 
as "Inc." R. 177, which conferred upon "Little" the right to use 
the name "Little League" in connection with its activities. R.267. 
The charter also conferred upon "Little" the right to wear Little 
League approved emb 1 ems and patches, and provided access to standards, 
guidebooks, and insurance for the participants. R. 268 332. 
During one of the initial meetings of the organizers of 
"Little", the need for baseball equipment and uniforms was dis-
cussed. R. 142 - 143. Respondent, Dave Anderson, then Vice 
President of "Little" and director of "Little's" senior League 
I 
... 
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volunteered to contact various dealers in baseball equipment 
and uniforms, to determine at what price the needed equipment 
could be purchased. R. 143. Thereafter, respondent Anderson made 
contacts with representatives of appellant Smith and Edwards Co., 
then a dealer in baseball equipment, and found that appellant 
would give "Little" the best discount on baseball equipment of 
all dealers contacted. R. 143. The President of appellant, 
Albert Smith, in fact testified that the price he would offer, 
due to the beneficial nature of "Little's" activities, would 
be near cost. R. 239. 
Accordingly, during the course of the 1974 baseball season, 
approximately $4,000 (R. 149) worth of baseball equipment and 
uniforms was delivered to officers, members and coaches of "Little" 
by Appellant, and was used by "Little" participants during their 
league play. R. 312. The fact that "Little" received the mer-
chandise was stipulated to by the parties before trial. R. 139, 140. 
Further testimony revealed that "Little" never denied liability 
to Appellant for the equipment purchased. R. 194, 230. Testimony 
also clearly revealed that up to the date of the trial, Appellant 
had received only $149.00 as payment toward the debt. Exhibit 
19-P, R. 238. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The lower court's finding of fact that respondents were 
purchasing merchandise from appellant as agent's of Little 
League Baseball, Inc. was clearly erroneous and not supported 
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by the evidence. 
At the outset, appellant acknowledges that the trial court 
has been long recognized as a forum where justice and equity may 
be administered with a view toward finality, and that when judg-
ment is pronounced and findings made with respect to matters of 
fact adduced at trial through witnesses whose manners, credibili~, 
and demeanor the trial judge, sitting as trier-of-fact, has ex-
elusive view of, the reviewing court will exercise great restraint 
before that same evidence is reviewed again from the bare record. 
Nevertheless, there are occasions when the trial court, 
sitting as trier-of-fact, enters findings of "fact" \vithout making 
a sound survey of or according the proper effect to all of the 
cogent facts. In such cases, those findings must receive superior 
judicial inspection because they were obviously made with improper, 
unjudicious or illegal motives, however worthy. 
So it is with this case. The conclusion of the trial of 
this matter, the lower court, acting as trier-of-fact, found 
that respondents were not liable because they were acting as 
agent's of the Litt 1 e League Baseba 11 , Inc. (some ti, 12s referred 
to erroneously in the transcript as the National Little League.). 
R. 378, R. 97, Finding of Fact #14. Such a finding is wholly 
unsupportable by the evidence and is clearly erroneous. In 
preparing this brief, appe 11 ant, through its attorney, has searched 
every word of the 1ranscript and recorded separately every page 
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of said transcript wherein evidence concerning Little League 
Baseba 11 , Inc., hereafter "Inc.", was adduced. R. 164, 176, 
177, 212, 219, 220, 221, 222, 234, 235, 236, 237, 265, 267-270, 
273 - 276, 333, 361. Many of the references to "Inc." contained 
within the transcript are not material to the issue of agency, 
and ap~ear for the express purpose of establishing that respondent, 
Golden Spike Little League, hereinafter "Little," was "chartered" 
by "Inc." Those few references in the transcript dealing with 
"Inc." and concepts of agency or liability clearly establish 
that no agency relationship existed between respondents and "Inc." 
f.!:amples (our emphasis added by underlineation): 
A. Examination of respondent Randy Deem at page 92 of transcript 
(R. 220): 
"Q. Did you in behalf of Golden Spike Little League ever 
look to the ~ational Little League Incorporated or whatever it 
is, for payment of this obligation to Smith and Edwards? 
A ••••••• had nothing to do with the national people as far 
~ying the bills. 11 
B. Examination of respondent Dee Bloxham at page 108 of trans-
cript (H. 236): 
"Q ......• 1-1asn't it your understanding that you were pur-
chasing this equipment from Smith and Edwards for the National 
Little League and were expecting them to pay for it? 
A. ffo." 
C. [,;a111ination of Wesley Hariu, District Administrator for The 
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Northern part of Utah for "Inc." at page 140 of transcript 
(R. 268): 
"Q. The question, Sir, was, do these charters to the Golden 
Spike Little League bestow any agency upon the Golden Spike 
Little League or its members and officers to purchase equipment 
to be used by the Little League on behalf of or bind the parent 
corporation Little League Baseball, Inc.? 
A. No. This would be entirely up to the League themselves." 
and Mr. Harju again at page 142 of transcript (R. 270): 
"Q. . •.•. Then did you convey to Golden Spike Little League 
on behalf of Little League Baseball, Inc., the National Corpor-
ation, any authorization to purchase any equipment on behalf of 
the National Organization. 
A. No authorization was given." 
From the foregoing examples, the testimony clearly establishes 
that "Little" and other respondents were not agent's of "INC." 
and had no authority from them to purchase uniforms, balls, bats 
and the like. 
The record further reveals that the sole relationship be-
tween the respondents and "Inc." arose out of a charter issued 
by "Inc." to "Little", which enabled "Little" to utilize and 
play baseball under the name of "Little League", and to use or 
wear its emblem, insignias, patches and other sanctioned para-
phenal ia, and to have rule books, suggested by-laws and other 
similar material made available to them. Exhibits 150 and 160, 
R. 267 - 268, R. 270 - 271. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-7-
Does this mean that membership in the Utah Bar Association, 
evidenced by charter or certificate, confers upon the member the 
right to purchase office furniture, stationary, and other pro-
perty used in connection with the practice of law and then look 
to the Bar for payment? Nonsense'. So it is with trial court's 
finding of agency. 
The erroneous nature of the trial court's ruling regarding 
agency is further magnified by the testimony regarding the nego-
tiations between appellant and respondents which led to the pur-
chase "agreement." R. 238 - 240, 242 - 243, 346. The record 
in this respect is absolutely void of any mention of or reference 
to "Inc." 
Moreover, respondents almost without exception, in obviously 
selfserving testimony, consistently pointed the finger of liability 
to "Little", proclaiming in one accord that in purchasing mer-
chandise from appellant, they were acting for and in behalf 
of "Little." R. 157, 194, 212, 230. {See also excerpts from 
transcript, supra.) 
Jjever - no not once - does the record reveal that any of 
the respondents ever thought that they were acting in behalf 
of "Inc." regarding merchandise purchases. 
Based upon all the evidence, it is clear that insufficient 
evidence was adduced in the lower court upon which any reason-
able man could find that the respondents were acting as agents 
of "Inc." in their purchase of equipment from appellant. There-
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fore, appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse 
the finding of the trial court in this regard. 
POINT II 
The lower court's ruling that appellant knew that respondents 
were organizing under authority and direction of Little League 
Baseball, Inc. is clearly erroneous and not supported by the 
evidence. 
At conclusion of the trial, the lower court also found that 
appellant knew that "Little" was organizing under the authority 
and direction of "Inc." R. 377, R. 97, Finding of Fact #10. 
There is absolutely no evidence to ~pport such a finding. (See 
argument in Point I, supra, regarding negotiations between ap-
pellant and respondents leading to purchase agreement). 
Hence, even if this court were to find, upon a review of 
the record, that an agency relationship existed between respondent 
and "Inc.", a finding the appellant is persuaded is wholly untenable, 
the court must nevertheless find the respondent liable on au-
thority of Conner -vs- Steel, Inc. 470 P2D (Colo. Ct. App. 1970). 
The court in that case, espousing the "undisclosed principal" 
doctrine, found that the defendants admitted, as respondents did 
in this case, that there was an obligation owed to the plaintiff, 
but that it was an obligation of a corporation they allegedly 
represented, and not of the individual defendants. The court 
found that defendants had failed to disclose to plaintiff that 
it was acting for and in behalf of an undisclosed principal. 
In finding said defendant liable, the court concluded that an 
agent who purchases goods for his principal without disclosing 
-
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his agency becomes personally liable for the goods. 
Id. at. 
Hence, appellant respectfully requests that this court re-
verse the finding of the lower court that appellant knew "Little" 
1,as organized under authority and direction of "Inc., where 
absolutely no evidence in that regard was adduced, and enter 
its own ruling that respondents are liable for debts incurred 
by it in connection with the purchase of appellant's merchandise. 
POIIH II I 
The trial court's finding of abency between respondent's 
anJ Little League Baseball, Inc. should have been limited by 
the trial court to matters regarding use of name, rules, emblems, 
etc. 
In Noujoks -vs- Shurmann, 9 Utah 2d 84, 337 P2d 967 (Utah 
1959), the court found agency existing between plaintiff and 
defendant, but found said agency to have been established for 
a limited purpose. It stated at page 969: 
"It is appreciated that the fact that one may be an agent 
for one purpose does not make him an agent for every purpose, 
but the agency is limited to acts within the scope of authorized 
duties." 
Hence, even if the court were to find that agency existed 
betv1een respondents and "Inc." for purposes of using its name 
appropriately and utilizing its emblems and patches according 
to "Inc." standards, the evidence overwhelmingly compels the 
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conclusion that agency ends there and does not extend to respo~en~ 
purchase and use of appellant's merchandise. This view is amply 
and without conflict wholly supported by testimony adduced at 
trial to the effect that at no time was "Little" or its officers 
authorized to purchase equipment on behalf of "Inc." R. 270, nor 
did "Little" or its officers ever consider that they had such 
authority. R. 236. Moreover, although some of the respon-
dents testified in a general way that they were operating under 
the general direction of "Inc.", R. 222, 234-237, it is amply 
clear from the record that this was limited to equipment, patches, 
insurance, name use, and similar items. R. 332. 
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests this court to 
limit the lower court's finding of agency pursuant to law, and 
find respondents liable in connection with its purchase of 
appellant's merchandise. 
POINT IV 
The trial court erred in failing to rule that respondents 
are liable for their debt to appellant. 
Based upon the foregoing appellant respectfully urges this 
court to reverse the lower court's finding with respect to age~y. 
or limit said finding to matters dealing solely with use of name, 
rules, emblems, etc. 
In addition, appellant would urge this court to enter an 
order in favor of appellant and against respondents, and thereby 
find respondents liable for its indebtedness occurred to appellant 
T 
I 
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in the purchase of baseball uniforms and equipment. 
The l 011er court correctly ruled that "Little" was liable 
for the debt to appellant. This finding is strongly supported 
by the evidence appellant has reviewed herein. It is baffling 
to appellant how the court could find "Little", an unincor-
porated association, liable, but not the association's officers 
and agents who assumed its name and admitted acting in its be-
half. R. 157, 194, 212, 230. Such a finding compells the ad-
ditional conclusion that respondents are also liable for the 
debt. 
Rule 17 (D) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
the folloviing: 
"When two or more persons associated in any business either 
as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, 
not a corporation, transact such business under a common name, 
v1hether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against 
the defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of 
all the associates in the same manner as if all had been named 
defendants and had been sued upon their joint liability." 
Although the foregoing is arguably a rule of procedure, it 
codifies and sets forth a long standing substantive rule of law 
that officer's of unincorporated associations are liable for 
the debts of said association. 
7 C.,J.S., Associations, Section 20, p. 54; 6 Am. 
Jur. 2J, Associations and Clubs, Section 46, p. 477. 
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CONCLUSION 
The record clearly reveals that insufficient evidence was 
adduced at trial in the court below upon which the lower court 
could base its findings of agency and knowledge with respect to 
respondent's baseball equipment purchases and cognizance that 
"Little" was formed under the direction and supervision of "Inc." 
To the contrary, the evidence clearly establishes that respondents 
were at no time acting as agents of "Inc.", or if so acting, were 
acting as agents in a very limited manner. Furthermore, the 
evidence is absolutely void of any testimony that would tend to 
show that appellant knew tha1t "Little" was organized under the 
direction or supervision of "Inc." 
Therefore, appellant respectfully moves this court to re-
verse the lower court's finding of no liability and in particular 
its findings with respect to agency and knowledge, and based 
upon the testimony adduced at trial, and the lower court's cor-
rect finding regarding "Little's" liability, instruct the lower 
court to find respondents liable on the debt and to enter judg-
ment accordingly. 
.;-". 
Kespectfully submitted this ::;;/\o...'. 1day of July, 1977. 
o~vro [.-tCADWELL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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